3. How important or powerful was the Democratic Party between 1826 and 1840?
RESEARCH PAPER GUIDE
History 1301 OR 1302
Your Research Paper heading should be presented as this paper is set up, the research title, class section and your name, centered on separate single spaced lines. There is no need for a cover sheet or folder cover for this effort. Unlike this guide your paper should be double spaced between lines. This paper must be typed or word-processed to be accepted. Students will employ fonts no smaller than 8 (elite) or larger than 12 (pica) for the type size of the presentation. This font is 8.
The first paragraph will define the Who, What, When and Where of the assigned subject in no less then two or more than four sentences. I want sharp, clear concise sentences and proper grammar structure. Try to keep the sentence length at less than a maximum of fifteen words. Please refrain from employing endless sentences and incorrect grammar. In the last sentence of this paragraph you will state that you will describe, define or explain the subject of the paper assigned. In this manner you will create a Thematic Statement. Employ spell check and grammar check and try to utilize the Writing Center to assist in structure and editing of the effort.
Paragraph two should cite and explain the reason Why of the subject according to the Primary or Secondary source you select. I will not accept anything that employs “dictionary or encyclopedia” in it’s title. Your sources must be of academically acceptable material for a college level course. Database sources must end in edu. gov. lib. mil. or org.. A dot com source is never acceptable. Wikepedia Sources will result in failure for the effort. In citing sources for this effort I want MLA format, the title, author, copyright date and publishing house named’ so on.
Paragraph three should present the methods of How the effort or action was undertaken according to the source. Each of these sentences describing How the effort is undertaken should be like the lead sentence of a new paragraph. You must have a minimum of three how’s and you must list all how’s no matter the number.
Paragraph four should define the Result according to the source.
Paragraph five should employ the same format as paragraph two to cite and describe the Why from the Second College Level Source.
Paragraph six needs to define the methods How from the Second Source in the order the author provides. Often the same reasons are given for how a structure or event took place but the order is different and this effects the context of the paper and the result.
Paragraph seven needs to explain the Result as defined from the second source.
Paragraph eight defines the Why from your third source. Again employ the structure of the second and fifth paragraph to cite this source and define it.
Paragraph nine defines the How of the third source in the order and context presented.
Paragraph ten explains the result according to the third source as structured in paragraphs four and seven.
Paragraph eleven defines your interpretation of the resources. “According to my evaluation of the data and reflection X Source correctly defines the material assigned to my satisfaction. Therefore this is my on defense of my selection” if you have selected one source. If no one source defines the assignment employ “According to my evaluation of the data and reflection no one source correctly defines the materials assigned to my satisfaction. Therefore this is my interpretation of the assigned materials.”
Paragraph twelve presents either your defense of the selection of your interpretation according to your research. A DEFENSE, Three defined reasons in three separate sentences why you selected the material defining the subject assigned. Two reasons for why each of the other resources was not able to explain the subject properly. Or AN INTERPRETATION, Your why, how’s in the order you find them relevant and the most important result you have discovered from the subject assigned as you see them using the filter of rational thought. Generally you will find that you cannot meet the requirements of the paper in less than five pages of work and certainly need no more than ten pages to complete the effort. Stay concise and define specific reasons for your selections and define each how in a declarative sentence. Don’t through data at the effort. Provide direct and simple interpretations so that a clear summation is achieved. Good luck and maintain this goal, if you cannot describe, define or explain it you cannot employ it. This is a critical thinking effort that requires you make determinations according to your research and what you have determined from the resources you have gathered.
Sample Critical Thinking Paper
Why Did the United States Fleet defeat the Imperial Japanese Fleet at Midway?
William Jennings Bryant
On June 6th, 1942 a series of events and decisions cost the Japanese Imperial Navy the loss of four critically need aircraft carries off the Island of Midway. Command decisions by Admirals Isoruko Yamamoto and Chuichi Nagumo would
dramatically alter Japan’s abilities to dictate the strategic operations from offensive to defensive operations for the rest of the Second World War in the Pacific. The purpose of this paper is to describe the decisions, actions and reactions of
these two Japanese leaders during the critical hours of the morning and afternoon of the first day of the battle and how these decisions or failures to take action cost Japan not just the battle, but the war.
According to my first Source (1), Admiral Nagumo had never commanded air assets until assigned as leader of the Ist Combined Fleet. Nagumo was selected for this important leadership position because he was senior to other admirals and
enjoyed high caste standing as a relative of the Emperor of Japan. The Admiral spent his entire career to this point commanding surface vessels and fleets but had never flown in a carrier aircraft or planned carrier operations so he was
surrounded by staff officers who were selected by Admiral Yamamoto for their proficiency in carrier operations and had experience with the planning and operations of this manner of naval combat. Unfortunately on the day of Battle
Commander Mitsuo Fuchida, Akagi’s Carrier Air Group Commander was recovering from an appendectomy and Commander Minoru Genda, Admiral Nagumo’s Operations Officer was still suffering with a bad cold. While both men managed to
get to the desk to encourage pilots, Fuchida could not climb to the bridge of the ship and Genda in pajamas was barely able to function.
Admiral Nagumo would be presented with a series of unexpected crisis without his most trusted advisors. Nagumo was shocked when an American Fleet was spotted after he had launched airstrikes against Midway in preparation of invasion
of the island. The Crisis was made worse by incomplete reports that caused Nagumo who had ordered his remaining forces to rearm for more strikes on Midway after reports informed him the island still presented a threat. Nagumo was then
attacked by aircraft from Midway and while they inflicted no damage, they shocked the bridge staff with the determination and ferocity of these attacks which kept the carriers from launching a limited strike at the American force. Nagumo
was not assisted by Commander Genda who returned to the bridge in uniform but unable to focus and seemed to downplay the American Fleet’s abilities. Nagumo then decided to land the Midway Strike and launch an all out assault on the
American fleet without considering the time and effort to land, bring down, refuel and rearm the Midway Strike while jamming up the lower desks and keeping most of the prepared aircraft from being spotted on the desks of his carriers. Fleet
launched torpedo bombers attacked Nagumo’s aircraft carriers causing the fleet to turn to avoid the attack and bringing down the fighter cover to near sea level. Nagumo was surprised when American dive bombers dropped through what he
thought was solid cloud cover and in five terrifying minutes destroyed three of his four carriers, damaging his flag ship so that Nagumo had to transfer command to a cruiser. The Admiral saw the launch of his remaining carrier and listed to
reports from two separate squadrons reporting the destruction of two American vessels, without knowing that the Yorktown had been hit by dive bombers, repaired the damage and was struck again by torpedo bombers who reported the
Yorktown undamaged when they struck the ship with three torpedoes. Nagumo was struck again and lost his last carrier about 5:00 PM, at this point Admiral Yamamoto broke radio silence and ordered Nagumo to withdraw. Yamamoto who
had considerable experience with carrier tactics and operations was aware of the entire battle but never contacted or advised Nagumo until this moment.
The failure of Nagumo’s staff to advise him and Yamamoto’s failure to communicate to his subordinate at a critical period cost the Japanese the Kido Butai, the First Fleet and it’s ability to dictate tactical and strategic actions against the
United States Navy. The Japanese never recovered from this loss while the United States suffered through six more months fighting against odds while a new fleet of Essex Class carriers were completed and fitted out and new aircraft of
superior design and performance entered service. The Japanese Kido Butai would never again be as strong as it was at 10:20 AM on June 6, 1942.
According to my second source (2), Admiral Nagumo and Admiral Yamamoto acted almost as observers throughout most of the battle, with Nagumo failing to act decisively at critical junctures and Yamamoto listening to radio reports without
Entering into command decisions until the battle was lost. Yamamoto was unaware of the command disruptions on the Akagi during the entire battle, expecting Genda to guide his superior and Fuchida to lead the air groups with an
experienced and firm hand. Radio silence in the extreme kept the overall commander from being aware of the situation on the bridge of the Akagi and leaving Yamamoto uninformed of the course of the battle while the commanders of the
other three carriers fuming at what they perceived as Nugamo seemed to flay about with orders that he countermanded throughout the battle.
Gordon Prange presents a picture of Admiral Nagumo as a tentative commander who was risk averse and often confused as what to do next. Nagumo was surprised when strike reports from Midway stated a second attack was required.
Worse Nagumo and most of the fleet had never seen a determined effort to strike at them in the six months of war they had participated in. Genda appeared detached and unfocused and failed to “suggest” courses of action. Nagumo truly did
not anticipate the appearance of any American naval presence and became confused and befuddled when he ordered the change twice in thirty minutes of ordinance on the second-strike group. The admiral was unaware of the limits of his
aircraft since increase loads of torpedoes required the removal of fuel to assure the aircraft could launch since the Japanese employed less powerful engines on their aircraft at this point in the war. This fueling situation increase the time
needed to service and reload both the dive bombers and torpedo planes. Nagumo was personally shocked with the courage of s B-26 pilot who just missed crashing purposely into the Kaga and the cold purpose of the American torpedo pilots in
their obsolete ships pressing the attack against impossible odds. When the landing, loading, refueling and repairs of the Midway strike was completed Nagumo was stunned when American dive bombers, untouched by his fighter patrols and
largely untouched by the fleet’s anti-aircraft fire. Add to this the skill of these pilots to drive home the attack was unexpected to Nagumo and his staff while the Akagi desperately attempted to dodge the bombs that would destroy it. Nagumo
transferred his flag to a cruiser but failed for several minutes to acknowledge the requests of the sole remaining Japanese carrier for permission to launch a retaliatory raid against the American fleet. Admiral Yamamoto refuses to insert himself
into the situation until far too late in the operation and fails to grasp the situation and issues because of his strict adherence to radio silence long after his portion of the fleet has been discovered and reported by America PBY aircraft.
Yamamoto issues no orders or provides leadership and guidance throughout the battle.
The outcome of these events is the destruction of the key elements of the Kido Butia, the 1st Fleet. Reality seems missing in the conduct of Yamamoto whose invasion fleet is sighted and attacked by PBY aircraft the night before the main
Battle. Admiral Nagumo only reacts to situations that were not planned for, and then counterman’s his own orders on several occasions without regard to the effects of these changes to his ability conduct the battle as situations changed. In all
both senior commanders fail to exercise leadership, seek council or demonstrate flexibility in the face of tactical changes repeatedly.
My third source (3) focuses on the technical and technological difference between the United States leadership and the Japanese command structure. Some of these differences are shaped by the designs of ships and aircraft, but others are
created by a Japanese failure to adopt and adapt to lessons learned in the Battle of Coral Sea. Many differing outlooks are shaped by inflexibility to act on new doctrines and experiences faced within the proceeding months by the Japanese
Navy and it’s leadership.
While the United States focused men and equipment on breaking the Japanese N-25 Navy Codes, the Japanese demonstrated lax radio discipline at lower levels of command no real concern that in disseminating information from coded to
Uncoded radio traffic they were providing important clues as to the content and structures of their codes to the United States Navy codebreakers in Hawaii. The Japanese Navy did not desk spot most of its aircraft for launch, instead relying on
bringing serviced airplanes up from the hanger deck fully fueled and armed and then launching them as they rolled off the elevators to gain the greatest desk run for their underpowered torpedo and dive bombers. Japan never considered the
dangers of the policy of loading bombs and torpedoes in the Hanger Deck. The inability to restow ordinance when Nagumo ordered armed planes rearmed with naval battle weapons from bombs employed for airstrikes caused a massive pile up
of explosives on all the carries of the 1st Fleet during the battle, when the American dive bombers hit the Japanese carries more damage was done by exploding Japanese ordinance than the bombs of the enemy. Japan failed to learn lessons in
damage control and preventive fire suppression that the United States Navy adopted immediately after the Battle of Coral Sea. The Yorktown’s fires were put out, the flight desks repaired, and the engine rooms restored to operation in less
than twenty minutes. Fire prevention training was not practiced by the Japanese prior to Midway, yet fire had nearly sunk a second Japanese during the Battle of Coral Sea just a month before. The Japanese had not and would not later create
a means to rescue downed aviators or sailors who had to abandon ship costing Japan dearly in trained specialists and crews. The very design of Japanese aircraft created tactical disadvantages that would rarely be overcome, the Zero fighter
was designed for maneuver and climb rate but as the plane flew faster in combat its advantage was negated by stiffening controls and loss of maneuverability forcing the Japanese pilots into situations of tactical inferiority. The Thatch Weave
maneuver and keeping the throttles of Wildcat fighters open force the Japanese into a combat the Zero was not designed to meet. Add to this the failure of the Japanese to invest resources in Radar development and production caused the
entire fleet to be surprised by American dive bombers dropping through layers of clouds directly over the 1st Fleet without warning.
The relatively easy victories of the first six months of the war lulled the Japanese Navy into believing their carriers would never effectively be attacked by any enemy. The failure to adapt and adopt doctrines of operation that experience was
showing to be important and the hidebound reliance to complex plans that seldom survived the first minutes of battle cost the Japanese dearly. Strangely these mistakes were repeatedly made for more than a year after Midway by the
Japanese in the face or new realities of war.
According to my evaluation and reflection of the sources I employed I believe that the book Shattered Sword provided me with the best comprehension of in explaining the Japanese Defeat. Therefore this is my defense of my selection.
Shattered Sword deviled deeper into to failures of the Japanese Navy to adopt the lessons of combat and face new realities the Imperial Fleet had not considered before. The lack or training in damage control played a critical role in the loss
of several of the Carriers due to fire and repair of vital operating systems such as lights, water pumps and fire fighting equipment in the first critical minutes after the carriers were struck. The inability to stow ordinance immediately was in part
a failure of training and design of the ships of the 1st Fleet. My first source argues that the Japanese were exhausted by the tempo of operations and the ease in which success was achieved fails to take into account the inability of Naval
Commanders and Staffs to act on new threats and situations. The blind adherence to doctrine when faced with operational changes and the unquestioning acceptance of a commander’s confusing orders in combat and not addressed. My
second source failed to provide insight into why Nagumo and Yamamoto took oddly passive roles throughout the battle. Prange fails to understand that both commanders were not trained to act on new situations and in Nagumo’s case to rely
were on the tactful advice of subordinates who had greater knowledge of operations and tactics than their higher born leaders. This feature of Japanese social order is called the Genro concept in which subordinates never challenge and senior
officers wait for tactfully phrase suggestions. Neither Nagumo who had limited understanding of carrier operations or Yamamoto who was socially inferior to Nagumo and adhered to cultural traditions of not correcting those of higher station
so as not to cause loss of “face” in by the individual of higher station, choose to step outside their cultural roles during the battle.
According to my evaluation and reflection of the sources I employed I believe no one source correctly defines the actions and events that led to the Japanese defeat at Midway. There for this is my interpretation of subject.
I believe that the roots of the defeat were the successes of the first six months of the war enjoyed by the Kido Bitua due to strategic advantages created by the very existence of the fleet. There was no counter force in the Pacific that could
engage the Japanese 1st Fleet on anything like equal strength and capabilities. The limited resources of the American, Australian, Dutch and British in this area were massively outmatched by the strengths of the Japanese 1st Fleet to inflict
defeat in detail lulling the Japanese to believe that their fleet would all ways be successful and that their adversaries would all ways remain inferior in tactical ability and resources. By this point in the war the United States Navy carrier forces
were just as tired and just as stretched but Halsey, Nimitz and Spruance had been learning important lessons in operations and tactics while the Japanese ignored the same evidence. The loss of Lexington to a gasoline explosion hours after the
ship was struck by two torpedoes and the saving of the Yorktown by its damage control crews taught important lessons to the fleet and caused new training in fuel handling and repair that served the Americans well during the Battle of Midway.
The refinements in radar control of fighters protecting the United States fleet were unmatched by the Japanese. Most critical was the staff failures suffered by Nagumo and the lack of communication between Yamamoto and Nagumo during
the battle. The decision to place Nagumo in commanded of the 1st Fleet due to his social station rather than experience with carrier warfare caused disaster when is staff was reduced by disease and medical problems. Nagumo’s failure to
absorb carrier operations or to ask about the functions of important mechanics of flight preparation and launch was due in no small part to his fear that he would appear ignorant to his subordinates in knowledge and doctrine. These factors
created a series of events and decisions that caused the Japanese to lose the battle and the war.
1. Fuchida, Mitsuo, and Masatake Okumiya. Midway: The Battle the Doomed Japan, The Japanese Navy’s Story. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1955.
2. Prange, Gordon W., Miracle at Midway, New York, Penguin Books, 1983.
3. Parshall, Jonathan, and Anthony P. Tully. Shattered Sword: The Untold Story of the Battle of Midway. Washington, D.C: Potomac Books. 2005.
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